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NATURE’S INDIFFERENCE 
 
It is often supposed that natural entities such as mountains and rivers are of value despite 
their indifference to our interests. This paper has the following aims: (1) to clarify what it 
means to say that nature is indifferent in the relevant sense; (2) to contend, against critics 
such as Hans Jonas and Val Plumwood, that much of nature really is so indifferent; (3) to 
propose that nature can be – and sometimes is - of value, not despite, but because of its 
indifference to our interests. 
 
Why is the Grand Canyon of value? Various answers might come to mind. One might think that it has 
some sort of intrinsic value. One might point to the place’s cultural significance or to the fact that it 
provides a home for so many living creatures. If one believes that the canyon is natural and one 
agrees with Robert Elliot that that property is ‘always value-adding’, then one might cite its 
naturalness.1 But should the canyon’s inability to care about us and what matters to us appear on 
one’s list of value-adding properties? It is hard to see why it should. It is difficult to see why the mere 
fact that something is indifferent to us should add to its value.2 Indeed, some believe that that sort 
of indifference is a value-subtracting property. In The Wild and the Wicked, for instance, Benjamin 
Hale draws attention to nature’s indifference to ‘the plight of humanity’ in an effort to convince his 
readers that nature has less value than nature lovers suppose.3 Nature is not, he claims, ‘something 
we should adore’.4 It ‘acts according to law, to instinct, to need’, and functions ‘according to laws 
entirely indifferent to the concerns of humans.’5 For Hale, as I suspect for many people, nature’s 
indifference to our interests is intrinsically a bad thing, a ‘disvalue’.  
In the following, I challenge this view. I begin by clarifying what it means to say that nature is 
indifferent to our interests, before moving on, in sections 2 and 3, to consider how the indifference 
of those entities conventionally (though contentiously) referred to as ‘natural’ is supposed to differ 
from that of human artefacts. In Section 4, I contend, against critics such as Hans Jonas and Val 
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Plumwood, that much of nature really is indifferent to our interests. In sections 5 and 6, I draw on 
work in the fields of psychology and the phenomenology of religion to argue that nature can be of 
value, not despite, but because of its indifference to our interests. I end by suggesting that, for many 
inhabitants of post-industrial societies, some natural entities really do have value because of their 
indifference to our interests. 
 
1. Clarifications 
 
If theism is true, then perhaps God cares not just about us but about some of the things that matter 
to us. But if we restrict our view to the non-supernatural realm, indifference seems to be the rule. 
Aside from us human beings and some of the animals we have domesticated, most entities don’t 
give a damn about us or what matters to us. For the most part, nature is neither a nurturing mother 
nor, as the biologist George Simpson once suggested, a ‘wicked witch’.6 It simply doesn’t care either 
way. 
 I will give a more precise account of what it means to be indifferent to our interests below, 
but for now let us suppose that to say that x is indifferent in this sense is to say that it does not care 
about any human interests. ‘Care’ here should be understood in a broad sense as encompassing any 
sort of preference, not just those that are accompanied by ‘warm’ emotions such as love and 
compassion. So, on this reading of ‘care’, someone who doesn’t feel anything for sweatshop workers 
but thinks that justice nonetheless demands an end to their exploitation cares about sweatshop 
workers. ‘Interests’ should also be understood in a broad sense. To say that something is indifferent 
to human interests is to say that it does not care about what interests us humans or about what is 
objectively in our interests.7 
What does it mean to claim that nature is indifferent in this sense? Such claims can be 
interpreted in various ways, depending on what one means by ‘nature’. 
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Those who claim that nature is indifferent might, for instance, be using the word ‘nature’ to 
denote a category of entities. That is to say, they might mean to suggest that everything that is 
natural – in some specific sense of ‘natural’ – is indifferent to our interests. If ‘nature’ is construed in 
a very broad way, if, for instance, it is taken to denote everything that is not supernatural, then such 
claims are hard to accept since there exist some apparently non-supernatural entities - namely us 
human beings – who are not indifferent to human interests. In light of this, one might be charitable 
and interpret claims that nature (in the relevant very broad sense) is indifferent to our interests as 
claims that most natural entities are so indifferent. Alternatively, one might opt for some narrower 
conception of nature, according to which all those entities that count as natural are indifferent to 
our interests. I suspect it would prove very difficult to identify any plausible conception of nature 
that meets these requirements, though. For example, suppose that one stipulates that an entity 
counts as natural if and only if its current state is for the most part not the intended product of 
human actions. It would prove difficult to justify the claim that all those entities that are natural in 
this sense are indifferent to our interests. Loyal pet wolves would provide one putative 
counterexample.  
When people claim that nature is indifferent to our interests, they do not, however, always 
use ‘nature’ to refer to a category of entities. They sometimes take the word to denote some agent  
which is supposed to be indifferent to our interests. 
One might worry, with William Hasker, that to do this would be ‘to indulge in the pathetic 
fallacy’.8 This is not a decisive objection, however. Claims that nature is cruel are, it is true, likely to 
encourage the notion that nature as a whole is some sort of malevolent agent. Yet claims that it is 
indifferent are meant to put such anthropomorphic fantasies to rest. If any sort of personification is 
involved, then it is a self-effacing sort of personification. And in fact, those writers who, in 
unguarded moments, risk personifying nature are often quick to qualify the offending claims. For 
instance, though, as we saw, Hale claims that ‘Nature just acts according to law, to instinct, to need’, 
he takes care, a dozen or so pages further on, to disavow any anthropomorphism: 
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It is a curious fact about the English vernacular that we refer to events like the Boxing Day 
tsunami as acts of nature. This is fantastically misleading. Tsunamis are no more acts than 
the whirring of your computer’s hard drive is an act.9 
 
In some cases – and this is a third option – those who speak of nature’s indifference are conceiving 
of nature as a set of laws. These laws are thought to be, in various respects, nonhuman. They were 
not instituted by human beings, and they are not, nor have ever been, enforced by them. Moreover, 
they swing free of considerations pertaining to goodness, virtue or justice. 
To conceive of nature in any of these three ways - as a category, as some sort of agent or as 
a set of laws - is to think of it in general terms. It is to think of nature with a capital ‘n’. Yet those who 
conceive of nature in this way sometimes seek to support their claims that it is indifferent to our 
interests by referring to particular entities which they take to be natural. Take Hurricane Wilma, for 
instance.10 Someone who holds that everything that has the property of naturalness is indifferent to 
our interests might point to Hurricane Wilma as one example of a natural entity which is so 
indifferent. Someone who holds that there exists some agent, Nature, which rolls on heedless of our 
interests may claim that that agent’s indifference is symbolised or in some other way evinced by the 
indifference of the hurricane. Someone who takes ‘nature’ to denote a set of laws might say that 
Hurricane Wilma is the result of those laws governing how events unfold in a certain situation. 
So people sometimes speak not just of the indifference of nature in general, but of the 
indifference of particular putatively natural entities. It is important, however, to note that not all 
such entities are indifferent to our interests in the same way. 
Consider the following remarks from Edward Abbey’s Desert Solitaire: 
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The finest quality of this stone, these plants and animals, this desert landscape is the 
indifference manifest to our presence, our absence, our coming, our staying or our going. 
Whether we live or die is a matter of absolutely no concern whatsoever to the desert.11 
 
Abbey’s desert is incapable of caring about anything. But now imagine that you are standing in that 
desert, watching a vulture circling overhead. Although the vulture no doubt cares about some things 
– food, water, the well-being of its chicks – and although it may care about you (as potential carrion, 
or whatever), it is indifferent to your interests. I will express this by saying that it does not 
intrinsically care whether any of your interests are satisfied. Granted, you may share some basic 
interests – in eating, for instance - with it. Moreover, the vulture may care how your satisfying your 
interests could bear upon its efforts to secure one or more of its own ends. Perhaps, for instance, 
the vulture cares about your efforts to find water, but only because it stands to gain if those efforts 
come to nothing. But it does not intrinsically care whether or not you satisfy your interests, either 
because it is unaware of your interests or because it is aware of them but simply does not care 
whether they are satisfied.12 
Enough has, I think, now been said to allow us to distinguish two ways of reading claims that 
nature is indifferent. To say that nature (or whichever part of it we are considering) is indifferent in a 
strong sense is to say that it is incapable of caring about anything’s interests.13 The hurricane and the 
desert are in this sense indifferent to our interests, as is nature writ large (regardless of whether it is 
conceived of as a category, an agent or a set of laws). To say that nature (or whichever part of it we 
are considering) is indifferent to x’s interests in a weak sense is merely to say that it does not 
intrinsically care about x’s interests. The hurricane, the desert and nature writ large are all 
indifferent to our interests in this sense. But so is the vulture.14 
 
2. Nature’s hostility 
 
6 
 
In seeking to convey nature’s indifference I have followed convention by citing examples of entities 
that are natural in the sense of being largely unshaped by human intentions – hurricanes, deserts, 
vultures and so forth.15 But this presents a puzzle. Take Abbey’s desert. When Abbey maintains that 
the desert is indifferent, he means to draw attention to a difference between the desert and such 
entities as dining rooms, shopping malls and air-conditioned hotel foyers. Yet no such entities 
intrinsically care whether we humans satisfy our interests. The dining room, shopping mall and hotel 
foyer are, like the desert, strongly indifferent to our interests. So why the focus on such things as 
hurricanes and deserts? 
To answer this question, one must consider what an entity must be like if its indifference to 
our interests is to become apparent. One is, I propose, more likely to recognise that x is indifferent 
to one’s interests if x either opposes one’s interests or seems likely to oppose them. Suppose that x 
is a tall man who is blocking my view of some spectacle. I ask the fellow to move aside and he 
doesn’t respond. His lack of response indicates to me that he is indifferent to my interests. If, by 
contrast, x had moved aside after I had asked him to, then it is unlikely that I would have seen him as 
indifferent – and this would have remained the case even if he was in fact indifferent to my interests 
and had stepped aside simply because he himself wanted a better view. 
Similarly, people are more inclined to regard nature as indifferent when it thwarts their 
interests. (This explains why the phrase ‘nature’s indifference’ is apt to call to mind natural disasters 
brought about by such things as tornadoes and earthquakes.) The desert’s indifference is what 
(taking my cue from Abbey) I shall call manifest because the landscape is so obviously inimical to 
human life. Ditto such things as stormy seas and wind-blasted mountain passes. The same could not, 
however, be said of the hotel foyer, precisely because the place – the lighting, the gentle mood 
music, the comfy sofas, the pleasant air temperature - is shaped to satisfy certain human interests. 
So although the foyer cares just as little about our interests as, say, the desert, its indifference isn’t 
so obvious. Its indifference is not manifest. 
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I do not claim to be identifying necessary and sufficient conditions here. I do not mean to 
suggest that something that is manifestly indifferent must be prone to thwart our interests. (I give 
some examples of manifestly indifferent things that do not thwart our interests in the next section.) 
Nor do I mean to imply that it is only natural things that are so prone. The indifference of a reservoir 
could be manifest, as could that of a brutalist building, such as Trellick Tower in London.16 
Manifest indifference is to some degree subject-dependent. Like most people, I tend to see 
deserts as being inimical to human life and thus as manifestly indifferent to our all-too-human 
interests. Yet someone who had grown up in a desert might not regard the place as manifestly 
indifferent. Perhaps, on the contrary, she would see its contents as ministering to her interests. That 
cactus, she might see as a source of water; that outcrop, as potential shelter – and so forth. 
Be that as it may, any rational being, regardless of species, cultural background, etc, would 
surely regard some parts of nature as manifestly indifferent to their interests. The desert-dweller 
may be at home in the desert; but she will feel that other environments – marshes or forests or 
whatever – are manifestly indifferent. And even if some super-resourceful person, like TV 
personality and virtuoso backwoodsman Ray Mears, is at home pretty much anywhere, he can 
always turn his eyes to the night sky and reflect on the cold depths of space. 
 
3. Nature’s independence 
 
In The Solace of Fierce Landscapes, Belden Lane has much to say about the indifference of deserts 
and mountains. As the title of his book indicates, he takes that indifference to be evident in the 
‘ferocity’ of those landscapes – the fact that they tend to thwart rather than further our interests. In 
some passages, though, he gestures towards a different view. At one point, for example, he writes 
that the indifference of the Sinai Desert is manifested, not just in the place’s apparent hostility to 
human life, but also in its great age. Of the Desert Fathers, he writes that ‘The ancient desert had 
persisted for eons prior to their coming and would continue long after their death.’17 The implication 
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is that the desert’s indifference is manifest, not just in its ‘ferocity’, but also in its ontological 
independence from us. 
 Terence Malick’s film The Thin Red Line provides another example of how nature’s 
indifference can be manifest in something other than its apparent hostility to us. The film is about 
the Battle of Mount Austen, one episode in the Pacific War of World War II. As one would expect, it 
contains a lot of violence. Yet the scenes of violence are interspersed by other, very different images 
- a coconut lying on a beach, sunlight streaming through a forest canopy, a crocodile slipping into a 
swamp, stormclouds boiling over a line of trees. As Simon Critchley notes, these images evince 
‘nature’s indifference’: they convey to the viewer a sense that nature carries on ‘regardless of our 
strivings.’18 Here, again, we find nature’s indifference manifested in its apparent independence from 
us. 
 It seems, then, that there are at least two ways that nature’s indifference can be manifest. It 
can be manifest when the entity in question is apparently inimical to our interests. But it can also be 
manifest when the entity does not seem to depend for its existence on us. 
Here, again, a rough distinction may be drawn between how we perceive the indifference of 
natural entities and how we perceive the indifference of human artefacts. To return to our earlier 
example, the hotel foyer might be every bit as indifferent to our interests as is the desert. But its 
indifference is un-manifest, not simply because it so obviously serves certain human interests, but 
also because it is clear that the foyer would not continue to exist if humans ceased to maintain it. If 
the cleaners stopped cleaning and the repairers stopped repairing – if no one continued to maintain 
the place, then it would cease to function as a foyer and, indeed, eventually crumble to dust.19 
 
4. Three objections 
 
A brief recap. To say that nature (or some part of it) is indifferent in a strong sense is to say that it is 
incapable of caring whether or not any of us humans satisfy our interests. To say that nature is 
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indifferent in a weak sense is merely to say that it does not intrinsically care whether any of us 
satisfy our interests. Both natural entities (such as deserts) and human artefacts (such as hotel 
foyers) can be strongly indifferent; however, the indifference of the former tends more often to be 
manifest. So there are four options. The strong indifference of some entities is manifest, while that 
of others is not manifest. The weak indifference of some entities can be manifest (the circling vulture 
would be one example), while that of other entities is not manifest. (Think of a pet lizard curling up 
on one’s lap, solely in order to absorb the heat of one’s body. The animal may be weakly indifferent 
to one’s interests, even though, because it seems both so hospitable and so dependent on one’s 
care, its indifference is not manifest.) 
 I have suggested that much of nature is strongly indifferent. Not everyone would agree. 
Some find in nature what Thoreau once called ‘an infinite and unaccountable friendliness’.20 But 
what arguments can be marshalled against the claim that nature is indifferent? In this section, I 
consider three. 
 
Argument 1 
 
Holmes Rolston III maintains that ‘Nature is not all ferocity and indifference. She is also the bosom 
out of which we have come, and she remains our life partner…’21 
The implied argument is that nature is not wholly indifferent to our interests because it both 
generated and continues to support human life. But to make that argument is to take ‘indifferent to 
x’ to entail something like ‘neither generates nor supports the existence of x’, and that implies a 
nonstandard interpretation of ‘indifference’. It is more plausible to suggest that human life arose 
from what David Benatar calls ‘blind evolutionary forces that are indifferent to us.’22 Likewise, it is 
more plausible to think that the natural processes that continue, directly or indirectly, to support 
human life, such as photosynthesis, care nothing at all about human interests. In sum, then, 
Rolston’s claims may affect how some people regard nature. Aware that it is the bosom out of which 
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we have come and our life partner, they may cease to regard it as manifestly indifferent to our 
interests. Be that as it may, Rolston has not disproved the claim that nature is indifferent in the 
sense of ‘indifference’ spelt out above. 
 
Argument 2 
 
Several writers have suggested that claims to the effect that nature is indifferent presuppose a 
discredited metaphysical dualism. Such claims are, one reads, ‘a remnant from a dualistic 
metaphysics’.23 They presuppose ‘radical dualisms of mind and body, humanity and nature and… 
ignore the serious conceptual problems posed by such dualisms.’24 To claim that nature is indifferent 
is to betray one’s allegiance to ‘the Cartesian model of a natural world “out there” as an object to 
our manipulating subject’.25 It is to reaffirm ‘the Western tradition of denying nature and the radical 
distancing between humans and nature an environmental ethic must aim to counter.’26 
Such objections are not convincing. No matter how unfashionable the view is, one shouldn’t 
simply dismiss substance dualism out of hand.27 And anyway, even if no form of substance dualism is 
tenable, it is a further question whether the mere claim that nature is indifferent to our interests 
presupposes any such view. In fact it does not.  
To be sure, claims to the effect that nature is indifferent to our interests imply some sort of 
distinction between human beings and nature, but Jonas et al. are wrong to assume that that 
distinction must amount to a dualism. After all, not all distinctions amount to dualisms, since a 
distinction may legitimately be made between two items that are very much alike. (Think of the 
distinction between one woman and her identical twin, for instance.) And, indeed, the claim that 
nature is indifferent is consistent with various non-dualistic views. 
The views of Jacques Monod provide one example. Monod is no substance dualist: he’s a 
materialist monist.28 He does not denigrate nature by claiming that we humans are the only entities 
that have purpose and value. He maintains that human beings are ultimately purposeless 
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mechanisms. So when he suggests that man lives in an ‘alien world, a world that is deaf to his music, 
and as indifferent to his hopes as it is to his sufferings and his crimes’, he takes ‘world’ to refer to 
concrete reality as a whole, human beings included.29 Whatever its faults, his position is not 
dualistic. 
 
Argument 3 
 
In response to this observation, the critic could revise her objection. She could concede that claims 
to the effect that nature is indifferent to our interests do not necessarily presuppose substance 
dualism. Yet she could maintain that they do necessarily presuppose a disenchanted conception of 
nature. To suppose that nature is indifferent to our interests is, she might say, to presuppose that it 
is a cold and uninteresting Monodian place, made up of ‘inert, lifeless items’, bereft of their ‘own 
purposes’.30 This view, she might add, ought not to be accepted – not simply because it is false, but 
also because it could be used to license the exploitation of nature. (Kerridge, for instance, worries 
about the ‘convenient’ assumption ‘that if nature is indifferent, we should be indifferent in 
return.’)31 And if we must reject the claim that nature is disenchanted, then – the critic concludes - 
we must also reject claims that it is indifferent to our interests. 
There is something to this objection. Given our intellectual history, claims about nature’s 
indifference may well call to mind the notion that nature is thoroughly disenchanted – in effect, 
dead, like a corpse. And, although I won’t argue the point here, I agree that that notion is 
implausible. However – and here’s the rub - there’s no entailment here, for one could endorse a 
thoroughly non-mechanistic ‘undisenchanted’ view of nature and yet consistently hold that much of 
nature is at least weakly indifferent to our interests. For instance, an animist could consistently hold 
that mountains are both (a) sentient and (b) weakly indifferent to our interests. This would be to 
hold that although mountains care about some things, they do not intrinsically care whether or not 
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we humans satisfy our interests. Whatever its faults, that animistic view does not portray nature as 
disenchanted. 
 
5. Unselfing 
 
Some of those who claim that nature is indifferent do so in order to disparage nature – to portray it 
as a disenchanted realm. But others use such claims to achieve a very different effect. Some hold 
that it can, in certain circumstances, be a good thing that nature is indifferent to our interests. 
Christian theology provides one example. That intellectual tradition might, I admit, seem an 
unpromising place to look for praise of nature’s indifference; for many philosophers of religion 
regard nature’s indifference as evidence that God does not exist – one component of the problem of 
‘natural evil’. But there are countervailing tendencies within the tradition. Lane’s The Solace of Fierce 
Landscapes provides one example. In that book, Lane argues that living in harsh landscapes such as 
deserts can foster certain valuable religious attitudes and beliefs. For the desert fathers, he writes, 
the ‘grand indifference of limestone crags and wormwood served as an effective antidote to all 
delusions of self-importance.’32 The ‘austere, unaccommodating landscapes of desert, mountain and 
heath recall… the smallness of self and the majesty of Being’.33 
Though Lane writes of nature’s indifference, he does not do so in order to disparage nature. 
He does not portray it as a disenchanted realm, for instance. Instead, he claims that encounters with 
nature’s manifest indifference can prompt us to turn our eyes away from ourselves and our all-too-
human concerns – to ‘unself’, to use Iris Murdoch’s term.34 Lane does not claim that such encounters 
must have this effect, nor even that they tend to have it. (Such claims would need to be supported 
by empirical research.) He merely suggests that they can, in some cases, prompt unselfing.  
Yet even that cautious suggestion will make some uneasy. In ‘The Human Prejudice’, Bernard 
Williams criticises attempts to belittle human interests tout court by suggesting that they count for 
nothing from the perspective of the cosmos, and he might, one imagines, have had similar concerns 
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about claims that encounters with nature’s indifference can prompt one to reassess the value of our 
‘merely human’ projects.35 Not everyone finds this line of criticism persuasive; however, even if 
Williams’s objections to talk of the cosmos’s perspective are well taken, they do not militate against 
Lane’s suggestions.36 For Lane does not write of the manifest indifference of fierce landscapes in 
order to belittle human interests tout court. His point, rather, is that appreciating nature’s 
indifference can help to undercut what he calls ‘delusions of self-importance’ – not just the sense 
that one’s personal projects are all-important, but anthropocentric hubris: the view that human 
projects trump all others. His aim in doing so is, accordingly, not to provoke a dispiriting sense of the 
ultimate meaninglessness of all of our activities and projects, but to engender a sense of humility in 
the face of ‘the majesty of Being’. The person so struck will not be preoccupied with the question of 
how, if at all, her personal interests sit with respect to nature’s lofty indifference. So, for example, 
she will not think that those interests coincide with those of nature writ large.37 On the contrary, her 
self-interest will register hardly at all for her. Her gaze will be turned outwards. 
 
6. The value of nature’s indifference 
 
It is not the case that just anyone, encountering nature’s indifference in any sort of way, will be 
unselfed. As we saw, one needs to be able to see nature as manifestly indifferent. It’s likely that one 
also needs to approach nature in the right sort of way – with, as Charles E. Scott suggests, a certain 
kind of attentiveness and receptivity, perhaps.38 After all, a boastful and arrogant person who 
survives his encounter with the desert may well return from the place more boastful and arrogant 
than ever. 
It may also matter whether or not one experiences nature’s indifference at first-hand. It is 
unlikely that the desert fathers would have been unselfed by the desert if they had merely read 
about the place or heard tales about it from travellers. They were unselfed because they directly 
experienced it. Likewise, though it may be possible to be unselfed by images of deserts on TV, 
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actually being in the desert would, I suspect, work better. Indeed, more generally, it would seem 
that one needs directly to experience nature in all its lofty indifference if one is to stand a good 
chance of being unselfed by it. 
 One may also need to experience it from a place of safety. The tsunami on the horizon, the 
boulder hurtling down the hill in one’s direction, the numbing shock of the cancer diagnosis – these 
are encounters with nature’s indifference, but ones so terrifying as to impede unselfing. What is 
needed, it seems, is the safety that enables one to regard nature with disinterest – not complete 
disinterestedness, for then one could not take anything to be indifferent to one’s own interests, but 
some measure of disinterestedness nonetheless. 
So, provided that certain conditions are met, an observer may be unselfed by her 
encounters with nature’s indifference. Such claims need to be handled with care, of course. Just as it 
would be insensitive to tell an ill person the truth that illness can be edifying, so it would be 
insensitive to harp on about the possible benefits of appreciating nature’s indifference to those who 
are trying to recover from the effects of a tornado or an earthquake. In such circumstances, a good 
person’s concern for others would either drown out or silence any thoughts about the therapeutic 
value of appreciating what John Stuart Mill called nature’s ‘callous indifference’.39 Nonetheless, 
though more work would be needed to determine how much of an effect it can have, and on what 
sorts of people, it is plausible that appreciating nature’s indifference can have a therapeutic effect. 
Hale, it appears, sees just part of the truth: in some cases, nature may be of value, not despite its 
indifference, but because of it. 
Such things as vultures, deserts and limestone crags may indeed have a special value 
nowadays, precisely because they are manifestly indifferent. To see why, it may be helpful to 
consider two complementary tendencies. The following passage from Jonathan Franzen indicates 
the first: 
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[T]he ultimate goal of technology, the telos of techne, is to replace a natural world that’s 
indifferent to our wishes — a world of hurricanes and hardships and breakable hearts, a 
world of resistance — with a world so responsive to our wishes as to be, effectively, a mere 
extension of the self.40  
 
Franzen seems to suggest that to make the world responsive to our wishes is to eliminate its 
indifference. That doesn’t quite accord with how we have been using ‘indifference’ in this paper. In 
the sense of that word spelt out in Section 1, umbrellas, air-conditioning systems and all those other 
technological artefacts that render the world wish-responsive remain strongly indifferent to our 
interests. Even so, as such artefacts come to play larger and larger roles in our lives, nature’s 
indifference becomes less and less manifest to us. Take central heating, for instance. In days gone 
by, nature’s indifference would have loomed large in the lives of New Yorkers. It would have been 
evident in the freezing air pouring into their homes every winter. Nowadays, by contrast, many New 
Yorkers live in homes where the temperature can be precisely adjusted to suit not just their needs 
but also their tastes. Nature, in the form of wind, rain, sleet and snow, remains as indifferent now as 
it ever was; however, to those New Yorkers lucky enough to live in centrally-heated homes, its 
indifference is less manifest.  
Granted, nature’s indifference sometimes becomes manifest, even to those of us who live in 
highly user-friendly environments. Yet on those increasingly rare occasions when it does manifest 
itself, it tends to do so in circumstances which militate against unselfing. Consider a wealthy 
technophile who lives in the midst of a world precisely shaped to serve her interests. She watches 
news reports of tsunamis, volcanoes and earthquakes. But since she does not experience those 
manifestly indifferent phenomena directly, she is not unselfed. She isn’t entirely insulated from 
indifferent nature, of course. Like anyone else, she sometimes catches a cold or a stomach bug. Yet 
on such occasions, she finds she cannot regard nature’s indifference with the requisite 
disinterestedness. She is too caught up in sneezing or vomiting to contemplate the majesty of Being. 
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So, again, she is not unselfed. The wealthy technophile’s encounters with nature’s indifference tend 
to be neither direct nor sufficiently disinterested, so they tend not to inspire unselfing.41 
This, then, is the first tendency to which I mean to draw attention: the fact (if fact it is) that 
as our technological control of our environments increases, we are afforded fewer and fewer 
opportunities to unself because we are afforded fewer and fewer opportunities to appreciate 
nature’s indifference directly and with disinterest. The second tendency concerns narcissism, a 
personality trait characterised by ‘a cognitive, affective, and motivational preoccupation with the 
self.’42 Suppose that narcissism is a bad thing. And suppose that - as indeed numerous studies have 
reported - narcissism is on the rise, at least in certain demographics.43 In such times, encounters with 
nature’s manifest indifference might have a special value, precisely because they present us with 
opportunities to unself. Granted, empirical work would be needed to assess whether such 
encounters really do tend to have this effect. Moreover, it is unclear whether an extreme narcissist, 
still less someone who suffers from what is sometimes called narcissistic personality disorder, would 
be unselfed by their encounters with nature’s indifference. (Such people typically hate to feel 
ignored by other people; perhaps they also hate to feel ignored by nature.) Nonetheless, it is at least 
plausible to suppose that those of us who are moderately narcissistic might benefit from such 
encounters. For those of us who spend our days passing from one air-conditioned space to another, 
eyes locked on our i-Phones – for those of us living in such resistanceless worlds, the manifestly 
indifferent entities we occasionally encounter might have a certain sort of therapeutic value 
precisely because they so obviously don’t care about us. 
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